The Modular Cognition Framework is an account of cognition in the mind and not in the brain, and includes a clear delineation of the two intimately related concepts, mind and brain, and a definition of their relationship.
Abstract
Models of human cognition that look biologically plausible might in principle be a source of insights that could prove applicable to machine intelligence. The Modular Cognition Framework fits that description in terms of its biological credentials and its potential to identify the challenges confronting GenAI developers. However, it is an account of cognition in the mind and not in the brain. Accordingly, the account includes a clear delineation of the two intimately related concepts, mind and brain, and a definition of their relationship. If either brain or mind can contribute to this debate, a model of the mind could offer a more immediate promising source of inspiration than its complex neural underpinnings. Key features of the theoretical framework include its fundamentally heterarchical architecture having no single locus of control. In addition, general and domain-specific processing principles permit rapid, highly flexible, adaptable interaction between its network of modular systems as they collaborate in the execution of multiple tasks in a constantly changing environment. Eleven types of knowledge are constructed from experience using a similar number of inherited toolkits. Questions are raised as to whether the adaptable and highly creative character of evolved intelligence is reproducible in artificial systems, the best strategies for deriving benefit from studying biological systems and whether neural organisation is really the only place to look for biological insights.
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a crucial component of human cognition and one of its distinguishing features. The development of Large Language Models capable of successfully performing ToM tests at levels similar or superior to those reached by humans has sparked a fierce debate and great interest in understanding how they d...
M. A. Pisauro, E. Fouragnan· Behavioral Science· 0 citations
The Common Model of Cognition (CMC) suggests a unified
view of metacognition: cognition becomes metacognitive when
bounded information about the agent’s own processing enters
the ordinary cognitive cycle. Here we extend that commitment from human-like impasses, episodic reconstruction,
and hypothetical states to a less...
B. Goertzel, Patrick Hammer· Proceedings of the AAAI Symp...· 0 citations
Abstract Starting from Thomas Nagel’s classic essay What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, this article investigates the philosophical problem of consciousness and its implications for Artificial Intelligence. It argues that an objective description of physical and computational processes is insufficient to explain the subjecti...
L. Peruzzo· Revista de Filosofia Aurora· 0 citations
This article argues that human cognition is more than the performance of functions such as memory, decision-making, and attention. The brain also builds schematic models of those cognitive functions and uses those models to monitor, predict, and partially control them. When you introspect, your understanding of who you...
M. Graziano· Proceedings of the National...· 0 citations