This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework for sustainable co-investment in shared infrastructure under regulatory incentives. Multiple heterogeneous operators co-invest in a common infrastructure whose production capability evolves over time and is subject to operational variability. A regulator supports the deployment through incentive mechanisms designed to align individual economic investment objectives with the coalitional one. We formulate the co-investment problem as a transferable-utility (TU) coalitional game in which the value generated by cooperation depends on heterogeneous operational profiles, dynamic resource availability, investment costs, and regulatory incentive level. We show that the proposed coalitional game can be reformulated as a linear production game (LPG), whose dual prices yield a constructive and stable allocation of the cooperative surplus. Finally, we illustrate the proposed framework through a case study on co-investment among data center operators in shared renewable energy infrastructure, supported by government subsidies promoting renewable energy consumption.
This paper examines two interconnected challenges in Renewable Energy Communities (REC) optimization: investment in renewable technologies and equitable sharing of incentives, usually offered by a central authority. Focusing on a REC under the so-called virtual framework and composed of a household and a biogas produce...
A. Awerkin, P. Falbo, Tiziano Vargiolu· Annals of Operations Researc...· 1 citation
This study develops a cooperative game-theoretic framework for financing global public goods in an economy with asymmetric member states and applies it to the case of United Nations funding. The analysis examines whether a personalized-pricing contribution structure can improve upon an empirically grounded non-cooperat...
This paper examines how environmental regulation shapes pricing, capacity allocation, and infrastructure investment in the competitive Content Delivery Network (CDN) market. We develop a hierarchical game-theoretic framework modeling strategic interactions among multiple CDNs, a service provider, and end-users, capturi...
Burak Kara, Gwendal Simon, Bruno Tuffin· ACM Transactions on Modeling...· 0 citations
Dynamic coordination between regulatory authorities and industrial enterprises is essential for achieving sustainable manufacturing and intelligent environmental governance. This study develops an incentive-compatible differential game framework to investigate the collaborative optimization of local government regulati...
N. Kang, T. Hong· Advanced Electromagnetics· 1 citation
This paper investigates the dynamic coopetition and capacity-sharing strategies between an Integrated Manufacturer and a Developer under R&D uncertainty, focusing on the governance of strategically scarce capacity. By constructing a two-stage game model, we analyze how government intervention and risk-hedging mechanism...
Allocating scarce budgetary resources across the strategic objectives of the balanced scorecard (BSC) and the sustainability balanced scorecard (SBSC) is a central problem in sustainability-oriented strategic management. Existing approaches typically operate at the level of aggregated perspectives, rely on subjective w...
Mathias Yaksic, Luis Quezada, Jorge Zamorano· Sustainability· 0 citations
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