Allegations that TikTok shadow bans political content shape what creators post, what advertisers fund, and how regulators act, yet they are hard to adjudicate because platforms do not disclose how content is ranked. We test the claim with a dense hourly panel of 556,946 follower-normalized views across 2,753 videos from 67 accounts curated into pro and anti sides of three contested topics (U.S. immigration enforcement, Trump coverage, and Israel/Palestine). On-topic videos are identified by a multi-step classifier, and stance is taken from each account's curated side. The conventional analysis appears to answer yes. Pooling the hourly snapshots, the topic-conditional reach gap reaches p<10^-140. Analyzed at the account level, the independent unit at which we sample and assign stance, the gap disappears. Every account-level reach contrast is null after correction (BH-FDR q near 0.9). We find no evidence of moderate-to-large reach suppression on any topic. The null is informative. Account-level confidence intervals and a power analysis rule out such effects. As a design check, the same framework detects a clear asymmetry on a different outcome. Oppositional content (anti-Trump, pro-Palestine) earns more engagement per view rather than less reach (Cliff's delta = -0.51 and -0.64; q<0.03). Higher engagement does not by itself rule out suppression, but shows the design can detect effects of this magnitude. The apparent reach gap is an artifact of two factors. The first is pseudoreplication, which counts tens of thousands of autocorrelated video-hours as independent observations; the second is confounding, since the side that looks suppressed is larger and, on Israel/Palestine, posts mostly in Arabic. In this corpus, what is taken for a shadow ban is better explained by a more engaged audience than by a suppressed one. We close with what a credible visibility audit requires.
State-backed influence operations are routinely measured as high-prevalence sources of ``hate''and ``toxicity.''We argue those rates rest on a measurement error: the detectors behind them are validated to catch a broader definition inclusive of hostility or divisiveness aimed at an out-group, and so over-attribute hate...
Research on political polarization on social media depends on the ability to reliably measure partisanship in user-generated content. However, existing approaches are typically tailored to platform-specific properties, such as structural affordances or linguistic conventions, which hurts generalizability across platfor...
Fathima Ameen, Christopher G. Healey· arXiv.org· 0 citations
I document an ideologically asymmetric break in the pre-existing diversification trend of political discourse, emerging around late 2022, using 6 million Reddit comments from two cross-partisan forums, 2019-2025. Conservative users experienced an interruption of their prior diversification trajectory; progressive users...
Telegram is a lightly moderated platform hosting, among others, fringe and politically extreme communities, many of which migrated after being deplatformed from mainstream social media. While prior research has mainly analyzed political debate on Telegram through in-platform text, less attention has been paid to how ex...
Mateus Brito, Ester Souza, Thiago Braga et al.· Proceedings of the 37th ACM...· 0 citations
A set of “stylized facts” about state-backed influence operations now circulates across journalism, policy, and the peer-reviewed literature: that they are monolithic troll armies; that they win by weaponizing moral-emotional language; that they manufacture their own virality; that they learn and optimize against feedb...
The article argues for four planks of a workable response: platform accountability, mandatory labelling, source verification, and media literacy, and points to a research gap on enforcement, cross-border coordination, and the position of small language communities in detection systems.
M. S. Hanspal· Naveen International Journal...· 0 citations
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