Jul 2026· International Journal of Engineering and Modern Technology· 0 citations
TL;DR
A defensive architecture for under unbounded attack techniques and unenumerable attack objectives, where the highest-value security investments are those that hold regardless of technique, and relocates residual reactivity to a single measurable point.
Abstract
Generative AI has industrialized the attack on human judgment: voice cloning, real-time video
synthesis, and hyper-personalized phishing convert social engineering from a craft into a
commodity, while a residual category of attacks — those that redefine the objective itself, as
ransomware once did — cannot be enumerated in advance. We propose a defensive architecture
for these two conditions built on a single organizing claim: under unbounded attack techniques
and unenumerable attack objectives, the highest-value security investments are those that hold
regardless of technique. The architecture layers a mesh of strictly advisory AI sentinel agents,
which detect cross-surface incoherence rather than synthetic content, above a deliberately simple,
non-interpretive enforcement core holding a small set of hard invariants that no intelligence —
human or artificial — can rewrite quickly. We give the reactive-defender objection a full
treatment: the claim that any AI-era defense necessarily responds late. Our answer is that the
objection is correct for every layer that must recognize attacks, and that the architecture is
designed around that concession — detection layers are built for their own capture, while the
invariant core does not race because it constrains consequences rather than recognizing
techniques. The framework relocates residual reactivity to a single measurable point, the interval
between the world changing and the invariant set catching up, and proposes that interval as the
headline resilience metric. We state residual risks explicitly and outline an evaluation agenda.
The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive. Despite substantial prior work across cyber ranges, AI-driven attack, and AI-driven defense, this asymmetry pe...
Yuhan Meng, Shao-Fei Li, Jiong-Hao Huang et al.· 0 citations
This work proposes a self-evolving test-time defense built around a persistent, cross-interaction rule memory that substantially reduces attack success rates while preserving benign utility, remains robust under an adaptive composite-wrapper attack, and does not increase over-refusal as the memory grows.
I-Bench, a collection of seemingly harmless adversarial tasks targeting confidentiality and integrity attacks across three platforms, and HITLCUA, a comprehensive adversarial testing framework that integrates a real virtual machine operating system environment with isolated Docker-based web platforms, and simulates hum...
This work presents a trust-boundary-centric survey of foundation-model-powered embodied-agent security, and shows that attack research is concentrated on multimodal perception and action interfaces, while defenses are especially concentrated on action-level and runtime protection.
Jia-Wei Liu, Jia-Cheng Guo, Tian Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution environments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks. Existing work separately measures cyber capability and catalogs attacks against agent components, but provides less guidance on containing a capable agent within the environment...
An audit is proposed that measures the leave-one-out causal influence of each retrieved document and flags answers whose influence concentrates on low-trust documents, and proposes an audit that measures the leave-one-out causal influence of each retrieved document and flags answers whose influence concentrates on low-...