Language, Translation, and Epistemic Dislocation in Igbo Knowledge Systems: Implications for Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

This article examines the philosophical consequences of translating Igbo concepts into English before those concepts have been sufficiently articulated within their indigenous linguistic world. It argues that premature translation can produce what is termed epistemic dislocation: the relocation of knowledge from its native conceptual ground into categories that may preserve lexical reference while altering metaphysical, ethical, and relational meaning. The argument is developed through a qualitative philosophical method combining hermeneutic interpretation, comparative conceptual analysis, philosophy of language, and critical reflection on artificial intelligence. Particular attention is given to Chi, omenala, and mmadu bu chi ibe ya, whose meanings exceed common English equivalents such as “personal god”, “tradition”, and “a person is another person’s god”. The article further argues that artificial intelligence can amplify prior linguistic distortions because computational systems learn from available representations rather than recovering the original conceptual worlds from which those representations emerged. The article therefore advocates primary linguistic formation, layered translation, indigenous data sovereignty, conceptual annotation, and institutional support for indigenous language scholarship. The central claim is that epistemic inclusion requires more than multilingual output. It requires attention to the plurality of conceptual worlds through which human beings disclose, preserve, and interpret reality.