The Paradox of Platform "Gatekeepers" under Regulatory Intensification: The Sustainable Boundaries of Quality Governance in Live-Streaming E-commerce

Abstract

After experiencing explosive growth, live-stream e-commerce has continued to face frequent issues regarding product quality and transaction order. Platforms, entrusted with a gatekeeper role by regulation, repeatedly fail in their oversight duties, creating a structural dilemma that urgently requires explanation. This paper introduces the concept of the "gatekeeper paradox" and analyzes the underlying logic behind platforms' failure to act as effective gatekeepers through three mechanisms: interest structures, power asymmetry, and institutional design. The study finds that platforms' reliance on top streamers weakens their willingness to enforce standards; the misalignment between algorithmic power and quality review capabilities limits their effectiveness; and distorted incentive structures in current regulatory frameworks provide the institutional space for these two problems to persist. These three mechanisms reinforce each other, making "stricter regulation" unlikely to result in "more effective gatekeeping." Based on this analysis, the paper advocates shifting from command-and-control regulation toward a model of "controlled self-regulation," aiming to reconstruct the platform's gatekeeping incentives by reducing structural dependencies, enhancing algorithmic accountability, and activating multi-stakeholder reputational pressures.