Oct 2026· Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy· pp. 52-60· 0 citations· 27 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
An architecture that closes this gap without disclosing the artifact, composing two TEE workloads: attestable build, which binds a source code digest to a build artifact measurement, and attestable audit, which binds the same source code digest to the verdicts of automated audits.
Abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) prove the integrity of code and data to a remote peer through remote attestation: the TEE issues an attestation report by signing, with a hardware-bound key, its configuration information, including measurements (cryptographic digests) of the code loaded inside it. A verifier appraises the report by matching these measurements against reference values. When the measured artifact is proprietary, however, the verifier cannot derive the reference values itself: it can only confirm that something with a given measurement is running inside the TEE—not that the program behaves as expected—forcing full trust in the reference value provider. We propose an architecture that closes this gap without disclosing the artifact, composing two TEE workloads: attestable build (Hugenroth et al., 2025), which binds a source code digest to a build artifact measurement, and attestable audit (proposed in this paper), which binds the same source code digest to the verdicts of automated audits—fuzzing, static analysis, AI code auditing, formal methods—executed inside a TEE. Both are instances of Confidential Computing Proofs: TEE attestation viewed as a hardware-backed zero-knowledge proof. Chaining the two certificates lets the verifier conclude that the running artifact was built from source code satisfying the audited properties, without disclosing either the source code or the build artifact. A proof-of-concept implementation on Intel SGX with the Gramine Library OS, running the Bandit security analyzer on Python code, demonstrates the practicality of the approach.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) traditionally employ a ''measure-then-launch'' model, attesting all code and data before execution begins. While this provides strong integrity guarantees, it imposes a startup latency proportional to the total program size, which is a significant bottleneck for large-scale applica...
Zhen Huang, Jun-Hong Cheng, Yi-Jia Ma et al.· Proceedings of the 2026 ACM...· 0 citations
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) protect private memory and attest initial code and configuration, but neither constrain nor attest shared channels between TEEs or with the untrusted host. Confidentiality thus depends on the functional correctness of all in-TEE code accessing these channels: a single misuse can le...
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