Jul 2026· AI & SOCIETY· 0 citations· 29 references
TL;DR
This work argues that anticipatory regulatory governance rests on three operational premises—categorical stability, epistemic accessibility, and manageable pace—and that AI’s emergence, opacity, and velocity violate all three in compound, and proposes three premise-level substitutions each replacing a violated precondition with a weaker, design-addressable one.
Abstract
AI governance instruments are proliferating, and so are their difficulties. Across major jurisdictions and international bodies, reform efforts built on substantially different premises encounter a recognizably similar pattern of failure. I argue that anticipatory regulatory governance rests on three
operational premises
—categorical stability, epistemic accessibility, and manageable pace—and that AI’s emergence, opacity, and velocity violate all three in compound. These premises form a distinct layer of operational preconditions, not a complete theory of governance. Reform within the existing premises reproduces the violations they produce. I call this configuration the
reform trap
: a paradigmatic lock-in at the level of operational preconditions, distinct from path dependence and policy paradigm rigidity. The pattern is convergent across five strategies in active reform—categorical regulation, process-based management, information disclosure, normative guidance, and adaptive experimentation—and persists even in the most adaptive of them. I propose three
premise-level substitutions
—outcome observability, causal attributability, and enforcement capability—each replacing a violated precondition with a weaker, design-addressable one. These differ from outcome-based and performance-based regulation, which swaps instruments within an architecture whose premises remain stable.
The study develops a diagnostic framework that identifies three constitutive dimensions of misalignment and suggests that adaptive governance models incorporating structured flexibility such as curated AI tool marketplaces and expedited approval pathways are theoretically more effective than highly rigid governance reg...
Mia Wilson, Ethan Moore· Journal of Management and In...· 0 citations
This qualitative study conducts a comparative document analysis of ten influential governance instruments issued by UNESCO, the OECD, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United Kingdom, the Group of Seven, and Singapore.
Kwan-Hong Tan· Open Access Journal of Multi...· 0 citations
This Article argues that legitimacy is an autonomous regulatory objective, distinct from alignment and not secured by it, which seats consequential AI rule-setting in venues a polity already treats as authoritative.
A normative analysis of thirteen recent studies on the challenges of technology implementation, ethical trust, and legal regulation suggests that the current governance dilemma stems not only from technological limitations but also from institutional neglect, which enables accountability avoidance.
The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence from an analytical tool to a generative agent has created a fundamental "pacing problem," where technological capabilities outstrip the statutory and doctrinal frameworks of intellectual property law. This article analyzes the resulting legal ambiguities and regulatory gap...
Vani Bhushan· Tribhuvan University Law Jou...· 0 citations
It is shown that the “dark side” of AI governance is not reducible to isolated ethical failures but emerges as an institutional outcome of competing governance logics, shifting attention from technical risks alone to the organizational architectures through which responsibility, control and legitimacy are continuously...
Salvatore Esposito De Falco, Francesco Laviola, Francesco Mercuri et al.· Management Decision· 1 citation
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