Before and After Revelation: Qirqisānī on Human Reason as the Source of Moral and Religious Knowledge (With a Note on the Rationalism of Rav Saʿadya Gaʾon): A Chapter in 10th Century Karaite Thought
Abstract
This article examines the limits of human reason as a source of moral and religious knowledge in the thought of the tenth-century Karaite scholar Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī. While Qirqisānī assigns reason a central role in theology, legal analogy, and dialectical deliberation, the article focuses on a neglected dimension of his thought: the epistemological status of morally neutral actions—those neither intrinsically obligatory nor forbidden. Through close analysis of chapter 51 of the fourth treatise of the Kitāb al-Anwār wa-al-Marāqib, it is shown that Qirqisānī proposes a tripartite framework—necessity, rational morality, and revelation—arguing that the status of neutral actions cannot be determined by reason alone and requires explicit divine legislation. This positivist stance is contrasted with that of Rav Saʿadya Gaʾon, who holds that reason, grounded in the premise of God’s goodness, can establish the permissibility of beneficial actions without explicit revelation. Additional perspectives from Yefet ben ʿEli complicate the assumption that this debate mapped neatly onto the Rabbanite–Karaite divide. The article situates Qirqisānī’s position within contemporary Muslim theological debates on the moral status of human actions before revelation.