The Problem of Destiny, Divine Knowledge, and Human Action: Muhyiddin Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Metaphysical Perspective and Divergence from the Classical School of Kalam

Abstract

The problem of destiny, divine knowledge, and human action is one of the most complex debates in Islamic thought. Classical Kalam traditions—such as Mu‘tazilism, Ash‘arism, and Maturidism—addressed human freedom within a moral-legal framework rooted in creator-created dualism, utilizing theories of kasb (acquisition) and causality. In contrast, Muhyiddin Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) elevates this debate to a metaphysical and ontological dimension within the paradigm of wahdat al-wujud (unity of being). His understanding centers on a‘yan al-thabitah (immutable archetypes) and the principle that "divine knowledge follows the known" (al-‘ilm tabi‘ li’l-ma‘lum). Accordingly, destiny is not an external deterministic compulsion, but the spatiotemporal manifestation of a being's inherent, eternal potential.This study aims to examine the ontological foundation of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s conception of destiny and determine the true nature of human agency. Employing a qualitative, textual, and comparative methodology, the research analyzes primary sources: Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Fusus al-Hikam and Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, alongside foundational theological works including Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar’s Al-Mughni, Al-Ghazali’s Al-Iqtisad fi al-I‘tiqad, and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi’s Kitab al-Tawhid. The study focuses on key concepts such as the status of non-existence (al-ma‘dum), divine knowledge (al-‘ilm), and acquisition (kasb). Rather than offering a simple juxtaposition, the comparative approach evaluates how classical Kalam measures freedom on a moral-legal axis while Akbarian metaphysics operates through an ontological lens. Crucially, the study addresses the primary counter-argument against Ibn al-ʿArabī’s framework: that the unchosen nature of a‘yan al-thabitah reinstates a form of metaphysical determinism (jabr). It demonstrates how Ibn al-ʿArabī resolves this tension through the rule that divine knowledge follows the known, preserving genuine human agency. Ultimately, the investigation proves that wahdat al-wujud does not produce a fatalistic view that negates human volition. Instead, by systematically contrasting Akbarian metaphysics with classical Kalam, the article offers a remarkably coherent, alternative definition of freedom, presenting a nuanced resolution to a deeply rooted theological dilemma.