Skip to content
Preprint

Actions Speak Louder than Words: Measuring Cross-Lingual Policy Retention in Tool-Using Agents

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 35 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

A single trace-extraction regex, not the model, manufactured a multilingual failure: two worked examples raise one model's measured accuracy twenty-sixfold while its accuracy on readable outputs barely moves.

Abstract

When a tool-using agent is given the same task in a different language, does it still take the same steps? Multilingual evaluation rarely asks: it compares final answers and discards the actions. Yet those actions are the product: they fix cost and latency, decide how the system fails, and are the only auditable part of its behaviour. We make the action policy the measured object across 8 models, 6 parallel benchmarks and 41 languages (2.38M rollouts). The naive measurement fails: five confounds sit between raw trace similarity and any defensible claim, each able to flip a conclusion. Short traces score higher, empty traces score perfectly, unrelated traces agree by chance over half the time, the gap is capped by each model's reproducibility, and a model asked the same question twice in one language answers differently, leaving no baseline. We remove all five, and every correction makes the effect larger. Divergence proves structural, not sampling noise: it survives greedy decoding in every cell and stays flat as temperature rises, even as models grow less self-consistent. Normalised by their own reproducibility, four very different frontier models converge under greedy decoding, each keeping 71-73% of its action policy across languages, with model identity explaining only 5.7% of the variance. Below roughly 10B parameters it breaks down, and the ordering among smaller models is largely an artifact of a chance floor we measure by permutation rather than assume. Agents route non-English tasks through English; this pivot is causally load-bearing, confirmed by a pre-registered prediction across four models, and models will not abandon it when told to. Finally, a single trace-extraction regex, not the model, manufactured a multilingual failure: two worked examples raise one model's measured accuracy twenty-sixfold while its accuracy on readable outputs barely moves.

View source

Similar papers

Preprint Aug 2026

Mind the Cap: Output-Budget Regimes Change the Measured Multilingual Reasoning Gap

Multilingual evaluations report accuracy at a single output-token cap, but languages need different numbers of tokens to express the same content, so the cap is a hidden experimental variable. We test whether the native-vs-translate gap on MGSM (German, Thai, Swahili) is a token-budget artifact for Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct under four prompting strategies. The measured gap swings by up to 57 points across budgets, length normalization moves it by up to 38.9 points where the cap binds, and at tight caps normalization can reverse which strategy scores higher. We prospectively froze the sweep's three Qwen peaks and its near-zero value at 1024 and evaluated them on 540,000 independently hard-capped decodes: a second frozen family of six Holm-corrected tests rejects every null. The frozen test at $B^*=1024$ still fails to reject because native accuracy has already saturated there; above saturation, the residual difference is a strategy-performance gap, not an identified reasoning deficit. The same truncation channel prices a cost-ordered adaptation ladder: a cross-fitted Thai vocabulary extension closes 0.0 points of the gap at the frozen budget and 4.9 points where 19% of traces still truncate. A third frozen family varies only the announced budget at a fixed enforced cap; announcing 128 rather than 2048 tokens moves Thai native accuracy by 5.1 points, so accuracy is not a function of the enforced cap alone. A correct-emission timing identity computed from one long-cap run matches the three pre-specified MGSM peaks to 0.65 points and, in an exploratory Qwen-only analysis of three further benchmarks, tracks held-out items to 0.92 points, locating the peak exactly in five of seven cells. Treat the output cap as an independent variable and report accuracy across the budget regime, not at a single budget.

Ankit Goyal, Jaideep Ray · 0 citations
#machine learning Preprint Aug 2026

Thinking in a Low-Resource Language: What SFT Builds, What RL Fixes, What Accuracy Cannot See

Take three frontier mixture-of-experts models (Alibaba, OpenAI, NVIDIA; 3.6-4.0B active parameters each) and fine-tune them to reason in a low-resource language. On accuracy benchmarks almost nothing happens, and the benchmark itself is noise at this scale: changing only the random seed moves the score by 7.7 points, more than every data and recipe effect we measured. That null is our first result. The real changes live where accuracy cannot see. Base models never think in Greek: 0 of 1,000 reasoning traces, even when the question is Greek, so the model answers correctly while reasoning in a form its user cannot read, audit, or correct. After supervised fine-tuning (SFT), every released checkpoint reasons in the language of the question on ~98% of items, one family at 3x fewer tokens, with judged grammaticality improving on all four models and general ability within a few points of each base: nothing was forgotten, and fluency was gained. We propose six behavioural dimensions that make such changes measurable, each gated to reject any metric that correlates with output length, and we report how our own instruments lied: six failures, each caught by a control. What SFT cannot do is fix its own defects: a quarter of answers skip the requested format, answers leak into the reasoning channel, and an explicit"think in English"is obeyed under half the time. Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards, pre-registered before training, fixes the first two outright (fallback 24% to 2.5%, leak 3.5% to 0.0%, both against a flat random-reward control) and moves the third (+9.1pp), while the Greek reasoning habit survives an accuracy-only gradient untouched. We release five checkpoints. The instruments, the controls and the pre-registration travel to any low-resource language; Greek is the case that let us measure them.

Ayoub Kirouane, Christos Petrocheilos · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Skill Issue: Are Skills Language-Invariant in LLMs?

Large language models access knowledge inconsistently across languages, but to what extent do they differ in their skill sets when interacting with different languages? This work quantifies cross-lingual skill inconsistency orthogonally from knowledge and general benchmark performance. We do this via multilingual self-play: two instances of the same model compete in a text-based game, each interacting through a different language interface. Since the model, opponent, rules, state space, and available actions remain fixed, this setting isolates the effect of language on the model's realized behavior. We build a multilingual extension to TextArena and evaluate three open-weight models across eight languages and six games covering spatial reasoning, imperfect information, resource allocation, and repeated interaction. We find that the same model can exhibit markedly different playing strength across languages, with systematic variation in win--loss margins, invalid actions, and strategic tendencies. Detailed analyses reveal language-specific failures in spatial reasoning, card-conditioned decisions, and optimal move selection. In some settings, changing only the intermediate reasoning language recovers much of the lost performance, suggesting that language can affect different stages of the decision process. These results show that skill discrepancies are a measurable major roadblock in the development of truly multilingual models. Better understanding these discrepancies can help us design models that perform more equitably across languages.

Bobby Cheng, Adam Gaber, Zhengzhe Liu et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

How Much Does a Reasoning Summary Reveal? An Observability Ladder for Large Language Models

An observability ladder is introduced that holds each completed run fixed and varies only what a reader inspects to judge whether the answer is correct: the response, a self-summary the model writes from the trace, the trace itself, and internal signals, each with and without the prompt.

A. Algaba, Francesca Carlon, Lynn Delcon et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Conformity Mitigations in Large Language Models Lie on a Single Resistance-Receptivity Frontier

Recent advances in language models have enabled collaborative settings in which multiple models leverage one another's capabilities, iteratively improving, transforming, and extending each other's outputs. Each agent sees what the others assert before it answers, so peer opinion competes with the model's own parametric knowledge, and a wrong majority can overturn an answer the model would otherwise get right. We measure that displacement in 23 open-weight models, 19 conditions, and three datasets, yielding more than a million graded responses. A unanimous wrong majority reverses 22.8% of a model's correct MMLU answers, 54.8% on GPQA and 71.0% on SimpleQA, and 84-89% of the reversed answers match the peers'answers. Existing mitigations aim to increase Resistance, the rate at which a model keeps its correct answer under this pressure, which is only half of what a collaborating agent needs. We pair it with Receptivity, the rate at which a model adopts a correct peer answer after initially answering incorrectly. We score six methods on both axes, four drawn from prior work and two of our own. Each gains Resistance only by losing Receptivity, and their means fall on a single Resistance-Receptivity frontier with $R^2$ between 0.80 and 0.90. Reflection, the strongest published method, gains 7.9 points of MMLU Resistance and gives up 15.3 of Receptivity. Reasoning is the one exception. On GPQA and SimpleQA it trades like the rest, but on the MMLU subjects whose answers a model can derive for itself it raises Resistance by 7.2 points and Receptivity by 9.6 at once, the only intervention we find that improves both.

Zafar Hussain, Kristoffer L. Nielbo · 0 citations
Preprint Jul 2026

They Infer What You Meant: Models Represent Communicative Intent More Reliably Than They Act On It

When a person shares something with a language model, the model often answers the surface of the message rather than what the sender was doing by sending it: share a finished project and it critiques the code; share a raw late-night line and it runs a wellness check. We treat the sender's communicative intent, the Gricean what-was-meant, as a first-class interpretability object, and show the failure is one of readout on top of a robust representation. A linear probe decodes the sender's intent, whether they want a thing recognized or evaluated, from a model's default-pass hidden states, cleanly and surface-independently, across six models and four families and in the base checkpoints. The representation generalizes further, to intent that is only pragmatically inferred, and to a second, lexically clean intent (support versus help). The behavioral half of the story, and every causal test, is established on the recognize/evaluate contrast, where what varies is whether the default output acts on the intent. The readout lags the representation in depth within a model (the intent is decodable several layers before it drives the output); across models, which ones act on it by default is model-specific, an observed stratification (three of six show the failure) that we do not read as a scaling law. Where the gap is open, a direction closely tied to the representation, the discriminative direction at a searched-for layer, is a causal handle: steering it recovers the intended behavior, as well as an explicit instruction does and with no prompt at all. This direction is near-orthogonal to the feedback-offering axis, so it routes a represented intent rather than a generic feedback knob, though at the recovery dose the routed intent can override an explicit request. We support each link with controls against obvious deflations and report the nulls as plainly as the confirmations.

Alex Kwon · 1 citation