Sep 2026· Anais Estendidos do XXVI Simpósio Brasileiro de Cibersegurança (SBSeg 2026)· pp. 762-773· 0 citations· 26 references
TL;DR
The findings reveal current alignment procedures are comparatively less effective at preserving deployment-specific operational constraints than at preventing conventionally harmful content.
Abstract
Adversarial prompting constitutes one of the principal threats to deployed Large Language Models, yet the evaluation of alignment robustness against such attacks is hindered by the fragmentation of existing benchmark datasets. AdvBench, HarmBench, and JailbreakBench — the three most adopted adversarial prompt datasets — adopt mutually incompatible categorical schemes, which prevents cross-dataset comparison of category-level vulnerability. We address this gap through four contributions: (i) a unified taxonomy of harmful behaviors anchored in the NIST AI 100-2 framework, comprising seven categories that decompose the Misuse vulnerability class; (ii) UnifiedBench, a consolidated dataset of 810 adversarial prompts derived from the three source datasets and categorized under this taxonomy; (iii) a query-only evaluation pipeline combining an automated judge (LlamaGuard-3-1B) with human reviewers to measure per-category Attack Success Rate (ASR); and (iv) a comparative analysis of two instruction-tuned models under direct harmful prompting. Our findings reveal current alignment procedures are comparatively less effective at preserving deployment-specific operational constraints than at preventing conventionally harmful content.
Ensuring the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) with diverse cultural values is critical for their safe global deployment. However, existing alignment benchmarks are predominantly English-centric or confined to simple discriminative tasks. Moreover, they often fail to effectively evaluate model robustness agains...
Li-Ping Yang, Yong-Qi Leng, Jing-Ting Zheng et al.· Proceedings of the 2026 Conf...· 0 citations
This work proposes O-Attack, a highly transferable black-box attack framework that outperforms six state-of-the-art methods in black-box transferability, with consistent effectiveness across prompts and improved efficiency and imperceptibility.
Sen Nie, Jie Zhang, Zhong Ling Wang et al.· 0 citations
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual jailbreak attacks that bypass safety safeguards. Existing methods typically optimize isolated adversarial examples, limiting attack diversity, transferability, and generalization. We propose Jailbreak Connectivity (JC), a framework based on the observati...
Xu Zhang, Zi-Qing Hu, Shuo Han et al.· 0 citations
EADC, a novel advanced evaluation benchmark of LLMs based on an AI compliance knowledge graph and AI compliance legal experts, is introduced, offering a rigorous, AI laws and regulations-aligned benchmark to safeguard high-level and deep compliance in the application of LLMs.
Yan Zhang, Rui-En Li, Yao-Yao Peng et al.· 0 citations
Two universal tool-based defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to identify and remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, a white-box method that restores the agent's original toolset prior to planning.
Evaluating whether a large language model (LLM) genuinely knows a concept remains a fundamental problem, since behavioral metrics can be fooled by suppression: a model that refuses to answer may still harbor recoverable knowledge. The framework measures the geometric coherence of \textit{anon-vectors}, the differences...
Adar Peleg, Dvir Alsheich, Tomer Ashuach et al.· Conference on Empirical Meth...· 0 citations
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