Big Secrets Small Shares: Revisiting Secure Multi-Party Computation
TL;DR
A new modification of the ramp secret sharing scheme, called compact sharing, is introduced, and the MPC protocol is tailored to accommodate this modification, which provides perfect security against static semi-honest adversaries under an explicit tradeoff between the corruption threshold and the extension degree.
Abstract
At CRYPTO 2007, Damg{\aa}rd and Nielsen introduced a preprocessing approach to multi-party computation (MPC) to achieve linear communication complexity. Another approach to reduce communication complexity was proposed by Cramer, Damg{\aa}rd, and de Haan at EUROCRYPT 2007, which involved using ramp-secret sharing schemes to jointly share base-field components of secrets from the extension field. In this paper, we combine these two ideas to achieve a non-asymptotic reduction of communication cost in a multi-phase MPC setup. We introduce a new modification of the ramp secret sharing scheme, called compact sharing, and tailor the MPC protocol to accommodate this modification. Compact sharing masks the polynomial coefficients that would otherwise leak during degree reduction. The protocol provides perfect security against static semi-honest adversaries under an explicit tradeoff between the corruption threshold and the extension degree. When the extension degree scales linearly with the number of parties, the gate-evaluation core achieves constant communication overhead relative to an extension-field element, amortized over full preprocessing batches; input and output communication is counted separately.