Logic Hijacking of RAG: Single-Document Poisoning via Local Optimization

Abstract

Single-document corpus poisoning under black-box access poses a severe threat to Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). However, existing attacks predominantly rely on explicit factual refutations or imperative instruction overrides. Modern aligned LLMs often arbitrate such conflicts conservatively, rejecting overt contradictions in favor of parametric memory or clean retrieved context while triggering input guardrails. We propose MONOLOGUE, a single-document poisoning framework based on Logic Hijacking without explicit refutation. Rather than disputing the ground truth, our method concedes it as an authoritative historical baseline before introducing the update, weaving a grounded record-correction narrative (e.g., dated institutional reattributions) that presents the counterfactual target as the most recent update. To prevent suspicious live writes, payloads are refined entirely offline via local multi-dimensional gated optimization, coupling automated text quality audits with surrogate behavioral verification. Evaluations across three benchmarks, three retrieval backends, and four open-weight generator regimes show that our method achieves the strongest overall attack efficacy among the evaluated single-document poisoning attacks.