Resilient Finite-Time Distributed Secondary Control of DC Microgrids Against Impulsive Cyberattacks

Abstract

Direct current (DC) microgrids (MGs) have emerged as a key architecture for renewable energy integration owing to their high efficiency, reliability, and scalability. However, existing secondary control strategies still face challenges in resisting cyberattacks and achieving rapid dynamic response, with limited research on impulsive cyberattack scenarios. This article proposes a finite-time (FT) distributed secondary control (DSC) strategy for DC-MGs subject to impulsive cyberattacks. First, a dynamic-consensus-based estimator is developed to estimate the average voltage through local information exchange. Based on this estimation, an FT control scheme is designed to achieve rapid voltage regulation and current sharing under impulsive cyberattacks. To capture heterogeneous vulnerabilities, distinct impulsive attack models are introduced for the voltage and current control loops. Furthermore, a frequency-aware settling-time analysis is performed, showing that convergence time increases with attack frequency, thereby providing a security-aware performance guarantee. Theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and resilience of the proposed method, while additional case studies verify its robustness to load variations, communication link failures, topology switching, and plug-and-play capability.