Jul 2026· Utilitas· pp. 1-10· 0 citations· 4 references
Abstract
In ‘Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation’, Erik Zhang attempts to reconcile partial aggregation with the individualist restriction: the aggregate value we forgo to satisfy a claim enters moral deliberation indirectly as a criterion for equal consideration. We argue that Zhang’s understanding of forgone value is flawed and requires two refinements. First, Zhang remains vague on which interests can count for forgone value. To accommodate partial aggregation, however, forgone value must be restricted to relevant interests. Second, his account entails an implausible principle of outweighing: we ought to satisfy weaker claims only if their number is much greater than their relative strength suggests. We offer a better understanding of forgone value that avoids the problem. While both refinements revise Zhang’s account, they retain its individualist character.
We combine a simple theoretical framework with a survey experiment to investigate how individuals sort fact from fiction and update their assessments in societally important but politicized topics, such as climate change and public health. We show that cognitive ability improves news discernment and in particular, the...
Melis Kartal, Edoardo Cefala, S. Kritzinger et al.· CESifo working papers· 0 citations
Robert Nozick doubted forms of consequentialism that employ so‐called “agent‐relative value” because he found them “gimmicky.” This doubt has been sharpened by Don Regan, Mark Schroeder, and others into the objection that agent‐relative value lacks the practical importance we associate with good
simpliciter
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What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most common method for answering this question is to look at all the options, add up the utility per person associated with each, and pick the option with the largest sum. This approach seems like the obvious, theory-neutral s...
Jared Moore, Ye-Jin Choi, Sydney Levine· Cognition· 0 citations
Short Abstract Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven interconnected domains. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailing...
Camilla Power, Morna Finnegan, J. Lewis et al.· Behavioral and Brain Science...· 2 citations· ⚡1
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