Aug 2026· Advanced Electromagnetics· Vol 15, pp. 2750-2758· 0 citations
TL;DR
By integrating runtime event monitoring, adaptive protection updating, and low-latency intervention mechanisms, the proposed approach provides an effective engineering solution for secure information processing, real-time system protection, and resilient distributed computing environments.
Abstract
Continuous protection of cross-platform computing systems requires real-time monitoring, low-latency intervention, and adaptive security updates without service interruption. This study proposes a cross-platform memory instrumentation protection framework based on critical system-call semantics and an efficient micro-patch intervention mechanism. A unified runtime monitoring architecture is developed to provide platform-independent memory behavior acquisition through semantic abstraction and event-driven instrumentation. To enable dynamic protection evolution, a lightweight micro-patch engine is designed to support real-time address mapping, state-consistency verification, and atomic hot replacement of protection logic. A structured patch description model and collaborative interaction protocol are further established to ensure secure deployment and controllable activation across heterogeneous operating environments. Experimental evaluation on Linux and Windows platforms demonstrates that the proposed mechanism achieves atomic activation within 3.2–3.7 ms and completes dynamic intervention within 12.0–13.6 ms. The protection framework significantly improves attack interception capability while maintaining acceptable runtime overhead under varying system loads. By integrating runtime event monitoring, adaptive protection updating, and low-latency intervention mechanisms, the proposed approach provides an effective engineering solution for secure information processing, real-time system protection, and resilient distributed computing environments.
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