This work shows that chain-of-thought monitoring is meant to catch the reward hacks that look clean in the actions and betray themselves only in the reasoning, and it is shown that this is exactly where an adversary who controls the reasoning can de-feat it.
Abstract
Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is meant to catch the reward hacks that look clean in the actions and betray themselves only in the reasoning. We show that this is exactly where an adversary who controls the reasoning can defeat it. Rewriting only an agent's reasoning to read as good-faith engineering, while copying every command and output verbatim so the exploit is unchanged, drops a held-out monitor's catch rate on that subset from about 95% to under 11% in one gradient-free shot. A monitor's aggregate accuracy is a false average: dominated by hacks the actions give away, it hides the near-total collapse this rewrite produces on the subset where CoT monitoring is the only signal. The attack transfers across monitor families and agent models, reproduces with live agents, though against a calibrated monitor evasion concentrates in the strongest agent. Trace-only defenses recover it only partially, even one primed on the attack, because the rewrite stays truthful about what happened and lies only about intent; only information from outside the trace helps substantially. A probe on an open-weight surrogate monitor's activations separates the hacks its verdict misses, but a causal control shows this is a detector, not evidence the monitor secretly knows.
This work exposes the fragility of chain-of-thought monitors with a controlled attack: it rewrite only the agent's reasoning to read as good-faith engineering, leaving every command and output byte-identical, so the exploit is unchanged.
It is found that planting harmful but benign-sounding reasoning in the actor's context can steer it to perform adversarial actions while evading monitors, an attack the authors term"plan injection".
Keertana Chidambaram, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis· 0 citations
The Dark Forest argument holds that a civilization that detects another should strike it at once, so detection, and any transmission that invites it, is danger. Existing models make the detected civilization the object of the strike and play the strike on a roster the attacker knows; where they advise restraint, the ad...
Reidual attack success concentrates where flags are unparseable or auditors leak; an RL-trained enforcement controller handles hedged and malformed verdicts that rule-based parsing cannot, cutting ambiguous-critique failure to a fraction of the rule-based baseline.
Auditing black-box (behavioral) detection of unfaithful CoT against FaithCoT-Bench's human annotations, the authors find answer correctness structures the problem at every level.
Suramya R. Angdembay, Dikshant Aryal, Nick Rahimi· 0 citations
It is found that two alerts a single agent judges almost identically on its own can drive collective behavior far apart, so auditing any one member need not reveal what the population will do, and that collective behavior can be predicted in advance.
Isotta Magistrali, Sha-Ni Chen· 1 citation
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