Aug 2026· Deleuze and Guattari Studies· 0 citations· 12 references
TL;DR
Why what is really a matter of data analytics and statistical prediction is so readily assumed to be a display of real intelligence and even emergent cognition is explored by genealogically tracing the relationship between machines, organisms and language.
Abstract
What happens when large language models (LLMs) begin to ‘speak’ like humans? Is it an instance of robot intelligence or reason? Or is it something else entirely? In this article I explore why what is really a matter of data analytics and statistical prediction is so readily assumed to be a display of real intelligence and even emergent cognition by genealogically tracing the relationship between machines, organisms and language. It becomes clear that machine–organism metaphors have a long history that can be traced back to René Descartes, which once again became prominent during the cognitive revolution and the subsequent development of cybernetics. Of interest is the role of Chomskyan linguistics in this history and critiques thereof by cognitive linguistics who argue for embodiment but retain some functionalist views, such as the primacy of mental representations. In recent work on enaction this is discarded and, as I show, enactive work on linguistic bodies brings us close to a Deleuzo-Guattarian understanding of language as assemblages of enunciation. Enactivists do not, however, have an explicit theory of technicity, which is where Bernard Stiegler, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari provide correctives. Taken together, linguistic bodies, alongside Stiegler's theorisation of grammatisation and mnemotechnics, and Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the translatability of language and of order-words as tensors provides us with an especially sophisticated framework for thinking about the Bayesian ordering of the world.
With the help of Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique – meaning an artificial, technological set-up that forces a certain part of reality to reveal itself in a way that can be scientifically observed – this paper tries to theorize large language models (LLMs) as a kind of “epistemological mirrors” that make symbol...
Large language models produce fluent, contextually appropriate language that invites the inference that something behind the output is thinking. The psychoanalytic theory of thinking, specifically the work of Wilfred Bion and Donald Winnicott read together, allows us to specify what thinking requires, what the LLM la...
M. Selek· International Journal of App...· 0 citations
It is argued that philosophical resources from debates about mental representation in the philosophy of mind can clarify what is at stake in recent claims about the convergence of representational properties across different AI models, and explain why alignment evidence alone is insufficient for strong metaphysical con...
It is argued that LLMs represent a fundamental shift in human-technology interaction, one requiring ritualistic linguistic precision rather than technical commands, and that effective prompt construction functions as ritual magic through three essential elements: clear and specific language, contextual framing, and str...
T. Malefyt, Matt Artz· Journal of Business Anthropo...· 1 citation
Progresses have been made on understanding emotion mechanisms of large language models (LLMs). However, how to explain emotion in LLMs, or even what constitutes good explanations, are less clear. Emotion representations, components, circuits are widely recoverable, but as explanations of a model's own computation they...
This paper asks: if large language models (LLMs) gave rise to phenomenal consciousness, what would it be like? I argue that if LLMs gave rise to phenomenal consciousness, it would be like being an impartial, improvising playwright rather than a character or a (roleplaying) actor or
an author writing a first-personal n...
Jonathan Simon· Journal of Consciousness Stu...· 0 citations
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