Aug 2026· Canadian Journal of Philosophy· pp. 1-20· 0 citations· 27 references
Abstract
Non-naturalists claim that normative properties are
sui generis
, attitude-independent, and irreducible to natural properties. A common objection is that although we shape our lives around normative properties, non-naturalism rules out any plausible explanation of how this is possible. Non-naturalism seems to imply that we are hopelessly alienated from the normative. Our goal here is to better understand this worry and use constitutivist resources to develop a novel response. The basic thought is that we are constituted—as deeply social agents—to be gripped by normative properties. So while our constitution does not ground normativity, it grounds our non-alienation from it.
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnatura...
Lucia Schwarz· Journal of Moral Philosophy· 0 citations
There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in...
Frances Egan argues for a deflationist view of intentionality, on which intentionality is merely part of a pragmatically motivated explanatory “gloss” on theories of mind and behavior. While sympathetic to the project, I worry that the view is inadvertently committed to genuine intentionality: For intentionality to be...
Angela Mendelovici· Mind & Language· 0 citations
Fictionalism is claimed to allow its advocates to do mathematics without having to commit thereby to the existence of abstract entities. Nevertheless, fictionalism is subject to a charge that has not received enough attention yet, namely, the nominalistic impurity objection. According to this objection, the fictional...
This volume presents a dialectic-idealist overview of natural language and natural (non-artificial) thinking. Pauli Pylkkö’s view is thoroughly non-classical and takes ambiguity and contradictoriness as vital and inalienable properties of all speaking and thinking. The main function of a sentence is to change the meani...
This paper investigates parallels between the Wittgensteinian rule-following problem and the “novelty objection” to intellectualist views of knowledge-how. I focus on two points of symmetry: a common puzzle about how standing knowledge relates to successful action in a potential infinity of novel cases; and a paral...
Natalia Waights Hickman· Episteme· 1 citation
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