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Stealing Split Learning Bottom Models by Recovering Embedding Geometry

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TL;DR

VENOM first learns a contrastive space over server-observed embeddings, then builds a neighborhood graph and trains a surrogate bottom model to match targets and respect local geometry via a neighbor-matching loss alongside pointwise and feature-shape alignment to preserve the relational structure that defenses fail to erase.

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