Four concepts of permission
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of permission within the set-theoretical approach to the logical theory of normative systems. Drawing on Alchourrón and Bulygin’s expressive conception of norms, and Žarnić’s formal reconstruction of von Wright’s later deontic logic, the study argues that the standard interpretation of permission as the derogation of a command fails to capture its pragmatic function. Building on a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive uses of deontic language, the paper develops an alternative reinterpretation of the set-theoretical framework in which permission is treated as an autonomous prescriptive speech act. Within this model, the relations among obligation, prohibition, and permission are expressed through two sets—commanded and permitted act-propositions—and then two perfection properties of ideal normative systems are identified—inner consistency and relational consistency. Finally, the analysis reveals that the notion of permission is even more ambiguous than the literature has so far acknowledged, distinguishing four types—normative, weak (negative), unilateral positive, and bilateral positive—and shows that the principle “Obligation implies permission” is valid only under specific interpretations of positive permission.