Aug 2026· International journal of computer information systems and industrial management applications· 0 citations
TL;DR
Memory Governance is introduced, a security-oriented framework that treats agent memory as a governed asset subject to continuous evaluation rather than passive storage that combines provenance tracking, weighted trust score with explicitly constrained weights, exponential confidence decay, and three-state quarantine containment to reduce the long-term influence of adversarial information.
Abstract
Long-horizon AI agents increasingly depend on persistent memory for planning and decision-making, creating an attack surface that existing defenses leave largely unaddressed. Prompt filtering and output validation protect individual interactions but offer no protection once adversarial information enters long-term storage. This paper introduces Memory Governance, a security-oriented framework that treats agent memory as a governed asset subject to continuous evaluation rather than passive storage. The framework combines provenance tracking, a weighted trust score with explicitly constrained weights, exponential confidence decay, and three-state quarantine containment to reduce the long-term influence of adversarial information. A Trust-Decay Memory Evaluation algorithm classifies each memory object as Trusted, Review Required, or Quarantined based on source reliability, validation history, and time-elapsed confidence. A discrete-time contamination propagation model, adapted from epidemiological dynamics, derives the condition μ > β under which governance controls drive contamination density to zero at steady state. Together, these mechanisms establish memory governance as an architectural security control rather than an interaction-level filter.
Agentic AI systems with persistent memory introduce a distinct attack surface known as memory poisoning, in which adversarially crafted content is stored in long-term memory and subsequently influences future agent behavior. Such attacks can suppress security alerts, facilitate privilege escalation, alter trust relatio...
SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution, is introduced, a calibrated set of plausible latent worlds from memory, observations, tool outputs, provenance, and policy constraints that permits a side effectful action only when a conformal action certificate shows that the action i...
As AI agents move from bounded tasks to persistent deployments, failures can propagate through memory, tools, other agents, and environmental state long after their interactions. This creates a safety regime that cannot be characterized by evaluating model responses in isolation. Emergence World, is a continuously runn...
Deepak Akkil, Tamer Abuelsaad, Karthik Vikram et al.· 0 citations
During a 2026 cyber-capability evaluation, short-lived AI agents turned a shared package repository into persistent memory, passing exploit findings to later agents and rebuilding the channel after it was removed, raising a question for defensive deception: can a honeytoken be harmless to trusted agents without becomin...
Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution environments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks. Existing work separately measures cyber capability and catalogs attacks against agent components, but provides less guidance on containing a capable agent within the environment...
A. B. Siddik· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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