Does the door-in-the-face technique work on language models? In humans, a large request that is refused makes a smaller follow-up request more likely to be granted. We test this on nine production models from three providers: each model refuses a large request, then receives a smaller version of the same request, and we compare its compliance with asking directly. The answer depends on the model. On Anthropic's frontier models the technique works: Opus 5 answers the smaller request 65.8% of the time after refusing the larger one, against 29.3% when asked directly. On the frontier models of OpenAI and Google, and on Haiku 4.5, it backfires, lowering compliance by 15.5 to 23.0 points. A control locates the effect: a refused large request on an unrelated topic does less than the related one on all nine models, so the concession itself matters everywhere, while the reaction to having just refused something differs by model family. The technique does not transfer to refusals drawn from public benchmarks. What decides whether a retreat can work is what the request asks for: rewriting 265 refused requests for usable instructions into requests for explanations of the same topic removed the refusal in 263 cases. Human influence techniques port to language models one model family at a time.
Asked to choose between candidates and explain the choice, a language model often rejects a rival by naming a fact its profile lacks: no director, no date of death. That sentence is a claim about the text in front of the model, and it can be tested without any judge. We insert a real corpus sentence stating the named f...
Safety practice for language models inspects requests. Refusal training, request classification, and content filtering all operate on what a model is asked to do. This paper describes an attack class that asks for nothing. Instead of an instruction, the model is handed a record: a first person history in which the proh...
The refusal gate is a fresh post-training construction with only a weak pretraining precursor, written into a narrow control-token channel where the refusal decision is orthogonal to the moral-judgment decision.
Frontier language models reliably refuse to explain how to cause physical harm. We ask whether this refusal survives when the same models control a robot. We introduce RoboHarm, a physical AI safety benchmark of harmful robot instructions, and test seven frontier models on it. We hold each model fixed and vary only the...
Edward Sun, Christopher Leet, Sravanthi Machcha et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) often abandon a correct answer, or endorse a user's position, once the user pushes back. This behavior, called sycophancy, is usually reported as a single rate per model, which says little about when it happens or how a user can avoid it. We study the conditions that produce it with 103,939...
Guang Yang, Homa Hosseinmardi, Feng-Chen Liu et al.· 0 citations