The literature on feasibility in political philosophy has been dominated by non-moralized accounts, but also moralized variants have been defended. Recently, however, it has been argued that unless reduced to mere possibility, also allegedly non-moralized accounts are in fact moralized, and therefore cannot do the theoretical work assigned to them. In this paper, we reject that conclusion. Whether moralization is understood in the commonsensical sense—according to which an instantiation of the concept itself provides a moral reason—or in the weaker sense of value-ladenness—according to which correct application depends on background evaluative judgments—the concept of feasibility does not collapse into moralization. The paper furthermore argues that feasibility should not be moralized, since doing so obscures the distinct role of feasibility in practical deliberation. A non-moralized concept of feasibility preserves the difference between what is infeasible and what is merely costly, demanding, or morally unattractive, and thereby retains its value as an analytical and practical tool in political philosophy.
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim?
This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral...
A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach...
Barry Maguire, Oded Na'aman· Philosophy and Phenomenologi...· 0 citations
It is argued that demonstrating internal incoherence is a necessary precursor to AI alignment as well as a broader phenomenon of epistemic instability in generative AI wherein models fail to reliably maintain coherence with respect to their own prior outputs.
Pegah Nokhiz, Aravinda Kanchana Ruwanpathirana, Helen Nissenbaum· 0 citations
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnatura...
Lucia Schwarz· Journal of Moral Philosophy· 0 citations
This book is a sustained attack on the claim that values are objective, in the world independent of people’s attitudes. It evaluates this claim in different value domains: moral, personal or prudential, aesthetic, and general evaluative. The first section greatly expands on J.L. Mackie’s appeal to moral disagreement...
Few philosophers attempt to establish that there is an evaluative and moral realm. They make these major assumptions without argument. This plays into the hands of moral nihilists and certain other moral skeptics. A major obstacle that prevents philosophers from developing such arguments is the long-standing view that...
Edmund Wall· 0 citations
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