We introduce an uncoupled learning algorithm which, when employed by all players of an arbitrary $N$-player normal form game with up to $K$ actions per player, guarantees $O(N^3\log^2 K)$ individual regret, uniformly over the horizon of play. The proposed algorithm - which we call higher-order optimism with discounting (HOOD) is a variant of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OptFTRL) that combines a discounted $(N+1)$-th order predictor with entropic regularization over a suitable"lifting"of the game's strategy space. This combination of ingredients is purposefully designed to dampen large oscillations of the induced sequence of play in a controlled manner, removing in this way a key stumbling block of previous attempts to achieve constant regret in general games. Our approach bears several striking similarities to the concurrent - and completely independent - work of Liu, Farina, and Ozdaglar (arXiv:2608.31166), who very recently derived an $O(N^{21}\log^{4} K)$ regret bound through the use of higher-order optimism and an exponential moving average estimator.
This work introduces \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average, and leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.
Mingyang Liu, Gabriele Farina, A. Ozdaglar· 5 citations· ⚡4
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret in self-play, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, every player's individual swap regret is $O(\sqrt n\,m\...
We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with $d$ actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d/t})$ with high probability, simultaneously at every round $t...
This work introduces Multiplicatively Optimistic Regret Matching (MORM), an uncoupled learning rule for finite general-sum games that combines a potential-based regret-matching argument with multiplicative stability and Hellinger control of strategy movement.
Can simple learning rules keep their regret bounded in self-play? Recent work achieves constant regret bounds through modified regularization and higher-order prediction. Yet for Optimistic Hedge, arguably the most canonical method in games, the best known individual regret bound remains logarithmic. In this work, we p...
This work introduces an independently randomized formulation in which each stopping rule is represented by an adapted, nondecreasing cumulative stopping process, and identifies an exact-potential subclass with a closed-form threshold equilibrium.
Exploring how generative AI could make machine vision more accessible to businesses. The post GenEye in a Box: Making Machine Vision Something You Can Just Ask For appeared first on GPT-Lab.
MIT News · Artificial Intelligence· news.mit.eduOct 7, 2026
Students in MIT’s Concourse program delve deeply into the human condition, debate challenging questions, and learn to develop judgment about issues that can’t be quantified.
Training AI agents with reinforcement learning can be challenging because their tools, context, and decision-making are managed by complex frameworks. Agent Lightning connects existing agents to RL training, making it easier to improve them without rebuilding them. The post Agent Lightning v1.0: A 3,500-Line Lightweight Agentic RL Framework for Training Agents with Real Harnesses appeared first on Microsoft Research.
MIT News · Artificial Intelligence· news.mit.eduOct 6, 2026
