Skip to content

An Anti-Sceptical Metaphysics and Epistemology of Perception

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 64 references

Abstract

This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. I argue that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.

View source

Similar papers

Open access Sep 2026

The Systemic Unity of Philosophy Through Holism and Realism

Given the increasing specialization of contemporary philosophical inquiry, this paper asks whether philosophy can still be conceived as a unitary form of knowledge endowed with a fundamental function underlying its various branches. It argues that the essential nature of philosophy lies in thought's never‐ending metath...

Antonio Lizzadri · 0 citations
Sep 2026

A Methodological Alternative to Epistemological Theory-Building: Reply to John Greco

This paper clarifies the methodology of my book, How to Take Skepticism Seriously (OUP, 2024). The book aims to dispose of external world skepticism without building or appealing to epistemological theory. John Greco urges this can’t be done. In response, this paper clarifies what is meant by “epistemological the...

Adam Leite · 1 citation
Aug 2026

Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science

Thomas Aquinas regularly claims that metaphysics is not merely scientific, but the highest and most certain of all the sciences, and his conception of metaphysics is one of the boldest and most epistemically ambitious in the history of philosophy. This book presents a new account of Aquinas's metaphysics, approached fr...

Philip-Neri Reese, O.P. · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

On the Metametaphysics of Law: A Revisionary Perspective

This article proposes a revisionary approach to the meta-metaphysics of law. It challenges the growing tendency in analytic jurisprudence to treat questions about the nature of law as metaphysical problems that require employing explanatory metaphysical tools (e.g., grounding). Instead, it argues that metaphysical cl...

Miguel Garcia-Godinez · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Saying, Showing, and Knowing: Epistemological Dimensions of Wittgenstein’s Response to Scepticism in On Certainty

This paper evaluates a certain kind of response to philosophical scepticism that is broadly inspired by Wittgenstein’s discussion in On Certainty (OC). Special attention is paid to the idea that we show our certainty and belief in particular assumptions through our actions, practices, and language-games, and that due t...

Anne G. J. Newstead · 1 citation
Open access Aug 2026

Epistemological Issues as Ontological Quandaries. Why Phenomenology Has the Edge over Analytic Philosophy

In this article I will try to show how phenomenological philosophy may come to terms with the predominant epistemological paradigm of our time in ways that analytic philosophy cannot do, especially by focusing on certain disciplines of natural science, primarily foundational mathematics (permitting this classification)...

Stathis Livadas · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.