Aug 2026· International Journal for the Study of Skepticism· pp. 1-26· 0 citations· 7 references
Abstract
Arata Hamawaki proposes that external world skepticism arises from dissatisfaction with the limitations of ordinary epistemic life. He offers a Davidson-style transcendental argument in response, urges that certain views of perceptual knowledge lead to skepticism, and suggests that we can’t properly claim to know there is an external world. I address each of these charges. After reviewing failings in Barry Stroud’s attempt to get skepticism going, I explain why dissatisfaction with the limitations of ordinary epistemic life does not lead to a reasonable skeptical conclusion. The Davidson-style argument is not needed for a satisfactory response. It risks obscuring our epistemic fallibility and vulnerability and perhaps expresses a yearning for more security than we can have. Finally, there is no good argument for the claim that we can’t properly claim to know that there is a world outside of our minds. An appendix addresses considerations about perceptual knowledge.
This paper clarifies the methodology of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024). The book aims to dispose of external world skepticism without building or appealing to epistemological theory. John Greco urges this can’t be done. In response, this paper clarifies what is meant by “epistemological the...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 1 citation
Crispin Wright urges that there is a compelling skeptical argument that the method of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024), cannot satisfactorily address. This charge is incorrect, as this paper explains: materials already in the book provide a satisfactory response. The paper clarifies my approa...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 0 citations
Blake Roeber’s
Political Humility
is a wonderful piece of work; it’s clear and accessible enough that I’d expect a general educated audience with no philosophical background to profitably read all but the last two chapters (which get more into the epistemological weeds than the earlier parts of the book), while sti...
Daniel Greco· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
We often accuse others, and sometimes ourselves, of engaging in, as psychologists are apt to term it, “motivated reasoning.” This is the charge that the collection, use, and interpretation of information have been warped by one'sdesires, andis often regarded as amounting to a charge of epistemic irrationality. In a 2...
Yuval Avnur, Dion Scott-Kakures· Philosophical Perspectives· 0 citations
ABSTRACT The skepticism in the field of epistemology has never lacked advocates and attackers. In order to defend skepticism and answer the question of how skeptics can have knowledge, this article offers a two-step response to the perennial skeptical challenge. First, it strengthens Putnam’s classical “brain-in-a-vat...
Xun-Lie Ma· Kriterion· 0 citations
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