Russellian monism and neutral monism: scrutinizing inscrutables
Abstract
This paper critically examines Haoying Liu’s recent challenge to Russellian monism (RM), often understood as the view that (1) physics describes natural phenomena entirely in structural terms; (2) such phenomena possess intrinsic characters, or quiddities, that constitute or ground what physics describes structurally; and (3) phenomenal consciousness is constituted, at least in part, by such quiddities. Liu argues that RM’s appeal is undermined by the epistemic inaccessibility of quiddities and their combinatory principles, rendering it liable to a historical decline akin to Thomistic hylomorphism. I contend that this critique overstates the degree of mystery inherent in RM. First, drawing on work by Torin Alter and Derk Pereboom (2023), I question whether RM is committed to the claim that physics captures only structural features of reality, thereby reopening the possibility that quiddities may be accessible to empirical or conceptual inquiry. Second, I situate RM within the neutral monist tradition that inspired it, showing how similar views in Ernst Mach and William James treat the fundamental constituents of reality as epistemically accessible. Finally, I revisit Bertrand Russell’s own formulation of neutral monism, arguing that it was intended primarily as a theoretical framework for situating mind and matter in nature rather than a discovery-oriented research program. These considerations suggest that Liu’s objection, while illuminating, does not decisively undermine RM’s philosophical viability.