SafeGEO: Understanding Generative Engine Optimization Risks in Recommendation Agents
TL;DR
SafeGEO is constructed, an evaluation suite with 22 GEO attack variants across 600 recommendation cases that empirically show that GEO attacks can promote flawed target products and whether agent-side design choices can mitigate this risk.
Abstract
Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) lets content owners rewrite web content to increase their visibility in generative systems. In recommendation agents, this creates a risk that sources controlled by sellers make flawed products appear better supported than they are. We study this risk at the generation stage by asking whether recommendation agents continue to make decisions that align with user utility when these sources are rewritten for GEO. To make this question measurable, we construct SafeGEO, an evaluation suite with 22 GEO attack variants across 600 recommendation cases. We empirically show that GEO attacks can promote flawed target products: they increase the rate at which such flawed products enter the recommendation set by up to 83.2 percentage points (pp). We further study whether agent-side design choices can mitigate this risk and show that simple defenses reduce harmful target promotion by up to 39.2 pp. These gains are substantial but do not restore the no-GEO performance, showing that GEO remains a serious risk despite mitigation.
