Sep 2026· International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems and Automation Control· Vol 14368, pp. 143681K - 143681K-8· 0 citations· 17 references
Engineering
TL;DR
The model maintains stable detection under different edge computing capacities and connects intrusion recognition, propagation assessment, and local response into a continuous evaluation chain, providing millisecond-level security support for safety-critical communication and control in autonomous vehicles and reducing the time available for malicious traffic to affect driving decisions.
Abstract
Autonomous vehicle in-vehicle networks integrate Controller Area Network (CAN), CAN with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD), in-vehicle Ethernet, domain controllers, and safety-critical electronic control units. Their high communication frequency, strong inter-node coupling, and strict real-time requirements make delayed cloud-based detection unsuitable for protecting perception, braking, steering, and powertrain control links. To address detection delay, uncertain attack propagation, and limited adaptability to edge deployment, an intelligent intrusion analysis model for autonomous vehicle networks is developed. A convolutional neural network–bidirectional gated recurrent unit (CNN-BiGRU) architecture learns local message disturbances and temporal communication dependencies, while an attention mechanism highlights high-risk windows for identifying denial-of-service (DoS), Fuzzy, Replay, and Spoofing attacks. The recognition output is further mapped to the in-vehicle topology by combining node criticality and link association strength to quantify propagation risk and determine response priority. Simulation results show an accuracy of 97.38%, an F1-score of 96.89%, and an inference latency of 14.2 ms under 8 tera operations per second (TOPS). The model maintains stable detection under different edge computing capacities and connects intrusion recognition, propagation assessment, and local response into a continuous evaluation chain, providing millisecond-level security support for safety-critical communication and control in autonomous vehicles and reducing the time available for malicious traffic to affect driving decisions.
The security of in-vehicle networks has become an essential issue for intelligent connected vehicles due to the increasing integration of electronic control units, vehicle-to-everything communication, and software-defined automotive functions. Conventional intrusion detection methods often suffer from limited feature r...
Hong Zhang, Lin Cheng· International Conference on...· 0 citations
Intelligent transportation systems (ITSs), Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication and autonomous driving technologies have brought about significant changes in the modern vehicular network. At the same time, the cyber-attack surface has grown, leading to new and existing advanced security threats for Vehicular Ad ho...
S. Hassan, Sadia Din, M. I. Mohmand· Italian National Conference...· 0 citations
The rapid development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has significantly increased the exposure of intelligent transportation systems to sophisticated cyber threats, particularly targeting in-vehicle communication networks such as the Controller Area Network (CAN). Conventional intrusion detection systems and traditio...
E. Winanto, M. B, Sharipuddin Sharipuddin et al.· Jurnal Teknik Informatika (J...· 0 citations
Uncomplicated application-level vehicular computing and networking (UAVCAN) is a higher-layer protocol built on the controller area network (CAN) bus to support control and status communication among electronic control units in unmanned aerial vehicles. Because CAN provides no native authentication or encryption, UAVCA...
Seoyeon Kim, Hyungchul Im, Jongsoo Choi et al.· Italian National Conference...· 0 citations
With the proliferation of intelligent connected vehicles, the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, as the backbone of in-vehicle communication, is vulnerable to cyberattacks due to lack of authentication and encryption. Existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) exhibit limitations in addressing data imbalance, complex a...
Ya-Li Hao, He Bai, A. Siya et al.· Scientific Reports· 0 citations
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