Hardware Implementation of a Stealthy and Lightweight Backdoor for CRYSTALS-Kyber in Hybrid Cryptosystems
TL;DR
The possibility of a Kleptographic backdoor on the NIST-recommended key-encapsulation mechanism CRYSTALS-Kyber is investigated, and the modified Kyber Key-Generation() algorithm achieves indistinguishable decryption failure probability compared to the original CRYSTALS-Kyber.
Abstract
The threat of practical quantum attacks has catapulted viable alternatives like Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into prominence. The adoption and integration of standardized PQC primitives across the entire digital stack are promoted by various standardization bodies, governments, and major corporate houses. A serious challenge in quantum migration is to ensure that there is no hidden backdoor in the PQC implementations of a hybrid cryptosystem (support for both pre-quantum and post-quantum algorithms), which are often procured from a third-party vendor. In this manuscript, we investigate the possibility of a Kleptographic backdoor on the NIST-recommended key-encapsulation mechanism CRYSTALS-Kyber. The modified Kyber Key-Generation() algorithm achieves indistinguishable decryption failure probability compared to the original CRYSTALS-Kyber. The Kleptographic module is also implemented in FPGA, embedded inside the CRYSTALS-Kyber accelerator with a very low area overhead (283 LUTs or 2% of total area), and thus can easily pass performance and functionality tests.