Buyout or revenue-sharing? platform supply chain governance, channel disruption response, and resilience investment under government subsidies

Abstract

The frequent occurrence of channel disruption risks poses a severe challenge to the resilience of digital platform supply chains. This paper, focusing on the governance choice between the buyout model and the sharing model of digital platforms, constructs a three-layer supply chain game model involving the government, digital platforms, and suppliers. It explores the resilience of investment decisions, governance model choices, and the effectiveness of government subsidy policies under disruption risks for the platforms. The findings of the research are as follows: First, the impact of unified subsidies on resilience investment is condition-dependent. Second, the platform model choice is jointly influenced by fixed costs, resilience costs, and disruption risks. Fixed costs are the key factor restricting the choice of the buyout model. Third, targeted subsidies follow the principle of incentive matching. The government can guide the platform to choose the desired model by adjusting the subsidy structure. Moreover, the endogenous analysis of ownership depth further reveals that the subsidy rate and disruption risk have a positive impact on the optimal ownership depth. Under disruption risks, this paper offers theoretical insights to support digital platforms in making governance decisions, and provides policy recommendations for governments to formulate differentiated subsidy strategies.