Dual Subsidy Policies and Pricing Decisions of Cross-Border E-commerce Supply Chain

Abstract

There is synergy space for dual subsidy policies, but precise threshold management is required to improve the comprehensive benefits of the entire supply chain. Both government promotion subsidies and platform tariff subsidies are regarded as key means to promote the development of cross-border e-commerce supply chains, yet the synergy mechanism of the two subsidies remains unclear. Against the background of intensifying tariff trade frictions, this paper constructs a game model with the participation of the government, cross-border e-commerce platforms, settled merchants and overseas consumers, and compares and analyzes supply chain pricing decisions under four scenarios: no subsidy, platform tariff subsidy only, government subsidy only, and coexistence of dual subsidies. The results show that a single subsidy policy cannot fully offset the negative impact of rising tariffs. Meanwhile, excessive platform subsidies will squeeze their promotion budgets and may induce merchants to raise prices. Although the linkage of dual subsidies can slow down the decline of demand under high tariff conditions, its effect is restricted by multiple factors such as subsidy intensity and tariff level.