Endogenous Game Transformation among Advanced Civilisations: Co-evolution of Technologies, Preferences, Players, Actions and Payoff Structures in Interstellar Strategy

Abstract

Interstellar game models normally allow strategies to change while holding fixed the players, technologies, preferences, feasible actions and payoff structure. This assumption is least credible for advanced civilisations operating across long technological and evolutionary horizons. This paper develops an Endogenous Game Transformation Model in which operational actions select outcomes inside the current game, while transformative actions alter the game itself. A game form is represented as a stochastic state containing the player set, technology vectors, preferences, information structure, action correspondences, utility functions and transition kernel. A continuity matrix allocates predecessor interests across descendants, mergers and extinction, permitting strategic identity to split or combine. The paper defines Transformational Markov Perfect Equilibrium and proves existence for finite discounted systems. Four analytical modules derive exact conditions for assurance technology to convert conflict into cooperation, defensive catch-up to close a temporary offensive action window, preference self-modification to produce peaceful or hostile fixed points, and autonomous replication to transform one counterpart into a population-level threat. A game-form distance and local bifurcation criterion identify regime transformation. Numerical illustrations show that a civilisation can rationally invest in changing commitment, identity and action architecture rather than merely choosing within a fixed Dark Forest game.