The entry of JD.com into the food delivery sector and the ensuing subsidy competition have resulted in irrational competition, merchant profit squeezes, and food safety risks in China. This study therefore investigates the collaborative governance mechanisms for food delivery platforms under involutionary competition driven by traffic contestation. A two-agent evolutionary game model between platforms and merchants is developed, and Q-learning simulations are conducted to capture dynamic learning behaviors. The analysis examines the effects of coupon face value, cost-sharing mechanisms, traffic incentives, and government incentive-penalty policies on the strategic choices of both agents. Key findings reveal that merchants are more sensitive than platforms to traffic incentives and government penalties. Traffic-dependent merchants and traffic-independent merchants exhibit significantly different responses to government interventions. The coupon face value demonstrates a threshold effect, where only a reasonable range encourages compliant behavior among both parties. Based on these results, a collaborative governance framework is proposed. For traffic-dependent merchants, the government should focus on regulating platform behaviors and supervising coupon value controls, while platforms should establish a reward-oriented, penalty-supported incentive mechanism. For traffic-independent merchants, the government should strengthen consumer-reporting penalty mechanisms and strictly control collusion risks between platforms and merchants. Platforms should increase inspection frequency and reinforce penalties to prevent, at the source, the decline in product quality and market disorder induced by involutionary competition. This study provides strategic insights for achieving collaborative governance of involutionary competition in platform economies under intense traffic contestation.
The results show that weak or static regulation may allow fraudulent strategies to persist or fluctuate, whereas stronger penalties and subsidies for honest transactions can reshape the payoff structure and promote merchant integrity.
Over the past decade, multiple governance failures in market-leading platforms have caused severe criticism from partners, customers, and regulators. This has led to the formation of an alternative concept called platform cooperatives, which are jointly owned and democratically controlled by partners and aim to create...
C. Stadler, Ulrich Pidun, D. zu Knyphausen-Aufseß· Schmalenbach Journal of Busi...· 0 citations
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance serves not only as a response to urgent climate risks but also as a strategic tool for sustainable value creation. However, the rise in greenwashing suggests gaps in existing governance frameworks. This study examines the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), a...
Zhen Wang· Business Ethics, the Environ...· 0 citations
The results show that governance effectiveness does not improve linearly with regulatory intensity, but may converge to multiple stable equilibria and exhibit strong path dependence, highlighting the importance of early institutional design and sustained incentive alignment in platform governance.
A three-dimensional “subject-behavior-responsibility” framework is developed to define platforms as providers of commercial public infrastructure and clarify their fiduciary duties, and three regulatory paths—ex-ante obligation, ex-post punishment, and commitment to rectification—are compared through a matching matrix.
A role-based evolutionary game model is constructed to examine how governments and enterprises adjust responsibility strategies under bounded rationality and shows two possible stable outcomes—mutual responsibility fulfillment and mutual shirking—with threshold-sensitive dynamics.
Mao Chai, Yao Tong, Ziqi Wang· Administrative Sciences· 0 citations
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