Sep 2026· IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems Part 1: Regular Papers· Vol 73, pp. 5806-5818· 0 citations· 30 references
Abstract
With the rising threats of side channel attacks and complexities of both on-chip and ambient environment, it is demanding to incorporate on-chip learnability into side channel attacks anomaly detection. This will enable offline-trained models to adapt to the new power profiles of emerging side channel attacks schemes, workloads, and varying environments. Existing side channel attacks detection techniques often fall short in in-situ learning or pose excessive on-chip integration challenges due to resource and data demands. This paper presents a novel neuromorphic “compute-in-Physical-Unclonable-Function” architecture, validated in 65 nm CMOS, designed for side channel attacks detection with on-chip learning capability and optimized area, energy and data overheads. We harness the physical unclonable function based key generator as a hyperdimensional encoder, enabling few-shot learning capabilities. The test chip achieves a detection accuracy of 97.2% and demonstrates true adaptability, restoring accuracy by up to 52% within a 5 ms after workload change. By unifying the security primitive and the compute engine, our design is achieve $7.5\times $ transistors reduction compared with an equivalent SRAM-based system while only imposing a 23.4% area overhead for the entire on-chip learning module. This work demonstrates a practical, silicon-proven solution that offers scalable, efficient and, adaptive security.
Securing Internet of Things (IoT) devices is important due to the rapid growth of smart devices and increasing demand for artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled functionality. However, IoT devices are often resource-constrained, making robust security measures challenging to implement. To address this issue, physical unc...
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Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a promising security primitive for lightweight authentication. As one of its silicon-based implementations, configurable Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF has attracted extensive attention for its simplicity. However, system variation and environmental variations can deteri...
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