Jun 2026· Constitutional and municipal law· pp. 19-24· 0 citations
Abstract
Explicit appeals for the protection of individual autonomy in the hereditary editing of the human genome are
increasingly being heard in the scientific literature. The author attempts to consider the category of personal autonomy
through the prism of philosophy, ethics and law (including the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation) and to establish the possibility of its implementation when
deciding on the editing of the embryo germline. An analysis of the multivariative nature of personal autonomy has shown that the full realization of autonomy is possible only by the individual himself, and this requires the search
for other adaptive approaches to its implementation in the context of genomic editing technology. As a solution,
it is proposed to consider the possibility of implementing the principle of individual autonomy when deciding
on the editing of the embryo’s germline through compliance with the requirements of respect and protection of human
dignity.
Research on the human embryo conceived in the context of medically assisted procreation, and which are no longer the subject of a parental project, aims to develop the technology of medically assisted procreation. But the doctrine is divided on the question of the legitimacy of this research. The source of this division is the legal status of the embryo. Is it a thing or is it a person?
If the embryo is a person, research on it is, in principle, prohibited; whereas if the embryo is considered a thing, this research is permitted.
Medically assisted procreation raises many ethical, religious and legal problems, the most important of which is the fate of embryos conceived in the context of medically assisted procreation, and which are no longer the subject of a parental project. The question has arisen as to whether these embryos could be the subject of research.
The central argument of this article is that the genetic manipulation of plants raises profound ethical questions that cannot be adequately addressed within a purely anthropocentric framework. Drawing on Hans Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility, the article argues that modern biotechnology transforms living organisms into objects of technological intervention, thereby challenging traditional distinctions between subject and object in the domain of technology. Because plants are living beings that possess their own intrinsic good and play a fundamental role in the biosphere, their genetic manipulation must be evaluated not only in terms of human utility but also in relation to ecological integrity, intergenerational responsibility, and the preservation of life’s evolutionary continuity. The article proposes an approach that remains largely unexplored in the international literature: interpreting plant genetic engineering through the lens of Jonasian ontology of life and the ethics of responsibility, thereby moving the debate beyond the limits of traditional anthropocentrism.
G. de Souza, J. R. de Oliveira· Philosophies· 0 citations
This study aims to reconstruct the constitutional status of embryos in the era of biotechnology, where in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo culture, cryopreservation, and embryo research have become commonplace. The current legal order regulates prenatal life in a fragmented manner across different domains. Notably, the Constitutional Court’s 2005헌마346 decision denied the subjecthood of fundamental rights of in vitro embryos prior to implantation and primitive streak formation, adhering to the 14-day rule. However, as technological advancements have enabled research beyond this limit, international research ethics guidelines have reclassified this boundary into an adjustable domain, exposing the rule's nature as a practical compromise. In response, this study proposes the individual continuity of human development—from fertilization to birth—as the core criterion for determining the constitutional status of embryos. By reframing the fertilization theory within the protective framework of human dignity and the right to life under Article 10 of the Constitution, this paper establishes a constitutional baseline for the definition of a human being that remains independent of technological subordination. Furthermore, by defining embryos as provisional and conditional subjects of fundamental rights, this study decouples the recognition of subjecthood from the calibration of protection intensity. It then demonstrates that tiered protection and the balancing of interests are achievable, given the distinct structures of fundamental rights conflicts between in vivo embryos/fetuses and in vitro embryos. Ultimately, this study seeks to present a coherent constitutional baseline regarding the question of 'who is a human being' in the era of biotechnology.
Jun Yeop Kim, Yoo Jin Kim, Seokmin Jang· Catholic Institute of Bioeth...· 0 citations
This article is devoted to the legal regulation of the use of genomic editing technology in individual states. In general, it can
be stated that in most legal systems there are restrictions on genomic editing in relation to hereditary genes, however, in rare cases
exceptions are allowed, which must be recognized as justified in view of the reality of threats to human life and health. Using the method
of comparative legal analysis, the author identifies the most optimal experience that can be useful to the domestic system of law-making
on the way to forming legislation in the field of public health protection.
Anastasia E. Kraynyukova· Civil society in Russia and...· 0 citations
Informed consent is one of the indispensable moral achievements of modern medicine. It protects patients against coercion, deception, and the unauthorized use of their bodies, while recognizing them as responsible participants in clinical decision-making. Yet consent cannot bear the entire weight of medical morality. It can authorize an intervention, but it cannot by itself establish that the intervention is medically beneficial, morally permissible, or consonant with the physician’s professional vocation.
This essay argues that the elevation of autonomy from a necessary safeguard to the governing norm of medical ethics leaves important questions unanswered. The claim is not that autonomy-based theories intend to provide a complete ontology of the patient. It is that they often rely upon a conception of the patient as an exerciser of choice while lacking the resources to explain equal moral standing when deliberation, communication, memory, or self-determination are diminished or absent.
The argument proceeds in two layers. On philosophical and professional grounds, it distinguishes authorization from justification, decision-making capacity from moral status, and patient choice from the internal goods and responsibilities of medicine. It then offers a Lutheran theological account of the patient as an embodied creature standing coram Deo and of medicine as a vocation ordered toward the health-related good of the neighbor. The theological account is offered as a substantive completion of, not a substitute for, the publicly accessible argument.
Consent is therefore neither rejected nor diminished. It is situated within a richer medical ethics in which patient agency, professional judgment, creaturely vulnerability, justice, and the objective but prudentially discerned goods of medicine mutually constrain one another.
Law is a dynamic concept. With the advancement of science and technology, the relevance of scientific evidence has also multiplied leaps and bounds. Presumption based on abstract principles of morality, human behavior, public policy, ordinary course of nature etc. can never have an upper hand over the scientific evidence accepted by the global society. In order to uphold the validity and authenticity of scientific evidence and to bring it out of the domain of right to privacy and right against self-incrimination under Article 21 and 20(3) of Indian Constitution respectively, Parliament enacted the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022. Conventional legislations like Indian Penal Code, 1860, Criminal Procedure Code, 1873, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 etc, often came in conflict with modular scientific evidence. At the time when such laws were enacted, the Legislature could not even imagine that something called DNA Testing could ever come into existence and become fundamental for identification of individuality. In contrast, the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 was designed to accommodate modern forensic techniques and now operates alongside the newly introduced Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which replaced the CrPC, 1973. With this background in mind, researchers have made a sincere effort to culminate the different contours of DNA testing, conflict between scientific evidence and presumptions of conventional law.
Vinod Kumar, Mehakpreet Kaur, Mona Goel· International Journal For Mu...· 0 citations