This paper provides a formal definition of Causal WMs (CWMs) grounded in the tasks they are intended to support, connecting existing work in causal representation learning, object-centric learning, causal discovery, structural causal models, and model-based decision-making.
Abstract
World Models (WM) are increasingly seen as a foundation for intelligent agents that can predict, plan, and act beyond their training distribution. In this paper, we study WMs from a causal perspective across multiple levels of abstraction, ranging from perceptual observations to building a conceptual representation of the structure governing the environment dynamics. We argue that useful WMs must go beyond generative capabilities alone: they should also capture entity properties, entity-to-entity interactions, and entity-to-environment interactions that determine and explain the dynamics of a system. We provide a formal definition of Causal WMs (CWMs) grounded in the tasks they are intended to support, connecting world modelling with existing work in causal representation learning, object-centric learning, causal discovery, structural causal models, and model-based decision-making. Finally, we relate CWMs to the literature on identifiability, clarifying when the components of a WM can be recovered from data and up to which equivalence. With this, we ground WMs in representations and structures that support causal reasoning and informed decision-making.
World models enable a predictive substrate for planning and action, yet existing formulations merely answer a physical question: what/where it is, and how will it evolve. Human behavior, however, is driven by hidden mental state (what a person believes, wants, intends, feels, and considers socially permissible), so a model that tracks the physical scene but not what each agent knows and believes about it predicts the wrong action for the right-looking scene. We formulate Mental World Modeling (MWM), a generic theoretical framework that makes mental variables core components of a world model rather than posthoc rationales: MWM aintains a coupled physical-mental world state, renders a target-specific partial observation, and simulates how candidate actions jointly update both components. We instantiate the framework in MENTIS, a training-free and fully inspectable baseline that decomposes the process into state parsing, target-observation generation, action decomposition, coupled physical and mental transition, and branch-level value evaluation. On a manually constructed, quality-controlled dataset of situated decision scenarios spanning text, image, and sounding-video stories, experiments with 8 modern LLM-based world models demonstrate that explicitly modeling the mental state is essential for predicting human decisions. Deeper analyses further expose the bottlenecks of current mental world modeling. We expect MWM as a next stage of world modeling, from simulating physical scenes to simulating the minds that act in them.
Predictive processing theories portray the brain as a hierarchical prediction engine that minimizes prediction error, yet they lack operational definitions for the structure of a"prediction,"the standardized response to a prediction error, and the mechanism that maintains consistency across successive updates. Bayesian cognitive science attempts to subsume all uncertainty under probabilistic belief updating, but it presupposes a closed hypothesis space and provides no generative account of how the objects over which probabilities are distributed become discrete, identifiable referents in the first place. This paper introduces Predictive Set Theory (PST), a formal generative framework that reconstructs cognitive architecture from first principles. PST anchors cognition in a minimal set of operations---a sensor formalized as an identity function, set-theoretic state refresh, and three fundamental forms of reference chains (reference, counter-reference, and semi-reference)---and rigorously derives core cognitive functions including state sequences, demand, comparison, efficiency, and finite-horizon probabilistic planning. Rather than modeling neural mechanisms, PST constitutes a design specification for any system that must maintain internal consistency while acting under incomplete information and irreversible risk. The framework offers novel resolutions to classical problems such as Russell's paradox, the cognitive status of G\"{o}delian incompleteness, the grounding of negative feedback, and the comprehension of film editing. The primary purpose of this paper is to establish, through the public academic record, the originality and completeness of the Predictive Set Theory framework.
Causal Bayesian networks (CBNs) and structural causal models (SCMs) are the dominant frameworks for graphical causal reasoning, but they cannot adequately represent all real-world causal systems. In particular, systems at equilibrium---where feedback mechanisms create cyclic causal dependencies---can exhibit causal semantics that are fundamentally incompatible with these frameworks: different interventions that enforce the same variable value may have different effects, rendering the standard ``perfect intervention''do($X = x$) ambiguous. We propose bipartite graphical causal models (BGCMs), in which the structure of a system of equations is encoded by a bipartite graph with variable and equation nodes. In this framework, a hard intervention do($f_j : X_v = \xi_v$) specifies which equation is replaced, which variable is targeted, and at what value---resolving the ambiguity of the standard notion. We demonstrate, through a detailed case study of a physical system, that this representation naturally corresponds to distinct real-world interventions. We formulate a Markov property in terms of a new graphical separation criterion (B-separation) that exploits the functional determinism inherent in the equations, and we extend it to settings with non-random inputs. We show how this gives rise to a do-calculus for reasoning about domain invariances. BGCMs strictly generalize CBNs and SCMs while retaining the ability to perform graphical causal reasoning.
Human-centric intelligence is evolving in the foundation-model era, with growing emphasis on scale, transferability, and general-purpose modeling. Yet it has not fully integrated with foundation models to achieve the comparable progress seen in them. More importantly, recent advances across this broad landscape remain fragmented across tasks, modalities, and research communities, leaving their intrinsic conceptual and methodological connections unclear. To bridge these divides and rethink human-centric intelligence in the foundation-model era, we introduce a full-spectrum human context taxonomy that integrates six interconnected levels by viewing humans as observable subjects through visual appearance and spatial geometry, as dynamic actors through kinematic dynamics and interaction modeling, and as situated agents through world simulation and embodied agency. We next present the methodological foundations of the field, covering human-centric data families, computational architecture paradigms, and representative training and inference optimization strategies. We then systematically review representative methods across these levels and organize the associated datasets, benchmarks, and evaluation metrics. We further discuss open challenges and promising research directions toward human-centric intelligence that is scalable, trustworthy, physically grounded, and deployable, aiming to provide a coherent framework and practical reference for advancing the field. Finally, we provide a systematically organized and continuously updated collection of human-centric AI literature and resources on our project page.
Yang Chen, Tianqi Wang, Xiaorui Jiang et al.· 0 citations
Today, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly increasing in many areas of society. While model performance on various tasks continue to impress, it does so at the cost of increased model complexity, such that most state-of-the-art AI models are effectively black boxes. Where human-made decisions typically are accompanied by human-understandable explanations detailing the reasoning behind the decision, incorporating advanced AI as part of a decision-making process reduces the transparency of that process significantly. Yet, the ability to explain decisions is essential for there to be understanding and trust. As a response to this, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has emerged as a field that aims to provide explanations of model behaviour. Methods categorised as post-hoc are designed to generate explanations for black box models after training, at no cost to model performance. In parallel with this, extensive work has been done in the field of causality to formalise the structure of human-understandable, causal explanations. This work presents a comprehensive literature review of the current state of the subfield of XAI that consist of causality-motivated post-hoc XAI methods. In order to clearly define causal XAI, a causal framework for categorising XAI is introduced, and three types of post-hoc XAI methods are identified: observational methods, internally causal methods and externally causal methods. Finally, externally causal XAI is argued a promising direction for reliable and understandable post-hoc XAI, with the ability to generate counterfactual explanations using a meaningful vocabulary, in line with the definition of counterfactual used in causal theory.
Anna Rodum Bjøru, Helge Langseth, Inga Strümke et al.· Machine-mediated learning· 1 citation
Causal Discovery (CD) from observational data faces two fundamental challenges. First, purely statistical methods often lack the power to resolve structural ambiguities in low-sample regimes. Second, although LLM-assisted hybrid approaches improve structure recovery through semantic reasoning, the influence of that reasoning on individual edge decisions remains largely opaque. Consequently, existing hybrid methods fail to satisfy a fundamental requirement: explaining why a particular edge is included or excluded in the learned directed acyclic graph (DAG). This is critical in real-world applications, where no ground-truth DAG exists and every structural decision must be independently justified. We formalize this requirement as decision traceability, requiring every inferred edge to be supported by auditable statistical evidence, Markov Blanket consistency, or explicit domain reasoning. We propose GENESIS, an explainable hybrid CD framework that decomposes graph construction into interpretable decision points. GENESIS first identifies and scores three-node structural motifs, including chains, forks, and colliders, to establish transparent structural priors, then progressively refines the graph by integrating these priors with observational evidence, invoking domain knowledge only when statistical evidence is insufficient. By design, every edge decision is resolved through an auditable source of evidence. Experiments show that GENESIS achieves 100% decision traceability across all settings, establishing explainability as a first-class objective in causal discovery. Despite this additional requirement, GENESIS consistently outperforms purely statistical CD methods on the majority of benchmark datasets across all sample regimes in terms of Structural Hamming Distance (SHD), while achieving performance comparable to state-of-the-art LLM-assisted approaches.
Abhinav Thorat, Ravi Kolla, Vishak K Bhat et al.· 0 citations