Aug 2026· Synthese· Vol 208· 0 citations· 42 references
Medicine
Abstract
In hinge epistemologies, epistemic justification for doxastic attitudes is possible only if a set of assumptions, called hinges, is taken for granted in our inquiries. While hinge epistemologists have focused on how hinges enable the justification of belief, they have not examined whether or how justified suspension of judgment fits within their framework. We argue that any attempt to account for justified suspension encounters two problems, both suggesting that suspension may depend on a hinge of its own. In the positive part of the paper, we show that suspending judgment, like believing and disbelieving, rests on a hinge that renders it both intelligible and justified. We develop the idea that justified suspension about ordinary propositions is explained by taking for granted that one is fallible. This view resolves the identified problems and clarifies how suspension constitutes a legitimate part of hinged epistemic rationality. It also connects hinge epistemology with debates on higher-order evidence and on reasons for suspension of judgment.
Our attention tends to be drawn towards things that matter to us. Yet sometimes we can take the things that matter to us for granted, such as a relationship or a moral commitment. A tragic fact of human life is that we can neglect the very things that are central in our lives. This paper draws from the literatures on h...
This book is a sustained attack on the claim that values are objective, in the world independent of people’s attitudes. It evaluates this claim in different value domains: moral, personal or prudential, aesthetic, and general evaluative. The first section greatly expands on J.L. Mackie’s appeal to moral disagreement...
Crispin Wright urges that there is a compelling skeptical argument that the method of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024), cannot satisfactorily address. This charge is incorrect, as this paper explains: materials already in the book provide a satisfactory response. The paper clarifies my approa...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 0 citations
Arata Hamawaki proposes that external world skepticism arises from dissatisfaction with the limitations of ordinary epistemic life. He offers a Davidson-style transcendental argument in response, urges that certain views of perceptual knowledge lead to skepticism, and suggests that we can’t properly claim to know the...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 0 citations
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim?
This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral...
