Dual-Effect Analysis of Research Institution-Supporting Contract Farming Supply Chains Under Government Subsidies

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the “Rural Revitalization” strategy, contract farming has emerged as a new mechanism and a growing research focus. This study employs differential game theory to systematically analyze the dynamic decision-making and operational performance differences among supply chain members by comparing scenarios with and without research institution participation, as well as different government subsidy policies. The innovative contribution lies in introducing a dual-effect index to capture consumers’ quality utility from agricultural products and psychological utility derived from supporting farmers. Furthermore, we explore the synergistic effects of research institutions’ technological empowerment and government subsidy strategies on supply chain efficiency. Through the above research and analysis, the study draws the following conclusions: (1) The collaborative agricultural supporting model significantly enhances both farmer yields and overall supply chain profits through technology diffusion and brand premium effects. However, revenue distribution conflicts may lead enterprises to limit their cooperation depth. (2) Government subsidies can alleviate benefit allocation conflicts. Subsidizing a research institution proves more effective at stimulating long-term technological dividends, while subsidizing an enterprise primarily ensures short-term market stability. (3) Brand advantage, technological leadership, and consumer preferences exhibit nonlinear driving effects on supply chain efficiency. Specifically, the positive impact progressively strengthens with wider brand advantages, greater technological leadership, and more intense consumer preferences. The study provides a theoretical foundation for tripartite collaboration, revealing the pivotal role of policy precision and dynamic benefit allocation equilibrium in agricultural supply chain upgrading.