Moral uncertainty in the Anthropocene: moral circle and precautionary animism

Abstract

This paper develops a normative framework for expanding moral considerability under conditions of ecological crisis and epistemic uncertainty. Building on The Moral Circle, I begin from the claim that a non-negligible probability of moral status is sufficient to generate moral reasons for inclusion. I argue that the force of Sebo’s philosophical argument is significantly strengthened when situated within the conditions of the Anthropocene. Ongoing biodiversity loss and the risk of irreversible ecological damage introduce an asymmetry of moral error: underestimating the moral significance of nonhuman beings may lead to permanent losses, whereas overestimation typically incurs reversible costs. This asymmetry supports a precautionary expansion of moral concern. The paper then brings this framework into dialogue with anthropological accounts of animism, interpreted not as a metaphysical doctrine but as a relational epistemology in which nonhumans are treated as subjects within networks of interaction. Finally, I examine recent legal developments recognizing rivers and ecosystems as rights-bearing entities, arguing that these can be understood as institutional responses to moral uncertainty. On this basis, I propose the notion of “precautionary animism”: a normative stance that, without endorsing animist ontology, adopts its practical orientation under conditions of uncertainty and ecological risk. This framework aims to integrate moral philosophy, anthropology, and environmental law into a unified account of non-anthropocentric ethics in the Anthropocene.