The Weaponization of Generative AI and Domestic Information Manipulation: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral FIMI in Guatemala, Ecuador, and Honduras (2023–2025)
TL;DR
This paper analyzes the systemic threat of election-related Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and proposes a decentralized democratic defense model based on Jean Cloutier’s émirec concept, introducing cognitive friction into digital consumption to foster bottom-up epistemic resilience.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the systemic threat of election-related Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) across recent Latin American electoral cycles in Guatemala (2023), Ecuador (2025), and Honduras (2025). Integrating the FIMI behavioral taxonomy with the DISARM framework and systems dynamics, we compare the transition from traditional digital propaganda to industrialized “algorithmic campaigns” driven by deepfakes, voice cloning, and media impersonation. Methodologically, we audit a database of documented media impersonations alongside international electoral observation reports. Our comparative analysis suggests that even if synthetic content cannot be shown to directly alter individual votes, it appears to reshape the emotional and symbolic climate of elections, which appears to exacerbate affective polarization and institutional distrust. We contextualize these dynamics within the slop economy—a structural digital divide in information quality between digital elites and digital commoners. Arguing that top-down regulations are insufficient against these decentralized threats, we propose a decentralized democratic defense model based on Jean Cloutier’s émirec concept, introducing cognitive friction into digital consumption to foster bottom-up epistemic resilience.