An Evaluation Agent, middleware that combines Natural Language Inference factual verification, a five-signal poison detector with relevance-weighted aggregation, and a Trust Index is proposed, which reliably blocks instruction injection of unsafe advice while contradiction and subtle semantic weakening remain hard.
Abstract
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds Large Language Model (LLM) outputs in external knowledge, but RAG systems usually trust whatever they retrieve, creating a Security-Reliability Gap: high semantic relevance does not guarantee factual truth. Adversaries exploit this through knowledge poisoning, inserting malicious documents to cause targeted misinformation. We propose an Evaluation Agent, middleware that combines Natural Language Inference (NLI) factual verification, a five-signal poison detector with relevance-weighted aggregation, and a Trust Index T = 0.4 F + 0.35 C + 0.25 (1 - P ) with a non-linear dampener for high-contamination contexts. On TruthfulQA with Llama 3.3 70B, the agent reaches 91% accuracy and 100% precision, with 100% recall on instruction injection, while in-place edits, such as entity swaps, remain hard to detect. Across three LLMs the Trust Index stays discriminative, with a Receiver Operating Characteristic Area Under the Curve (ROC-AUC) of 0.73 to 0.81; generation style matters more than model size, and per-LLM threshold calibration restores baseline competitive accuracy, whereas a weaker FEVER result shows that cross-dataset generalization requires domain-specific calibration. In a software-engineering use case, a secure-coding assistant over guidance from the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 and the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), the agent reliably blocks instruction injection of unsafe advice (F1 92%), while contradiction and subtle semantic weakening remain hard. Throughout, the agent measures detection of poisoned context before generation, not whether the LLM adopts the injected misinformation. We release the proposed approach, attack generator, and experimental artifacts at the link: https://github.com/GPT-Laboratory/TrustworthyRAG.
This work presents RAGSieve, which constructs a reference matched to each detection scope, which requires poison labels, a trusted corpus, or training to be constructed.
RAGuard, a layered defense against corpus-poisoning attacks on RAG pipelines, is introduced, showing that keyword-preserving poisons leave lexical retrievers such as BM25 essentially unaffected, an observation that delineates the boundary of the threat model.
It is proved that, under an honest-majority assumption and a representation-level separation condition, RAGSentinel exactly recovers a poison-free majority-sized context.
Yueyang Quan, Anjun Gao, Yu Xia et al.· 0 citations
The Tri-Layer Sieve is presented, a middleware defense that sanitizes retrieved evidence through cross-embedding-space clustering with an independent judge model, structural filtering of trigger-payload artifacts, and LLM consistency verification, and exploits a key weakness of retrieval-stage poisoning.
Muhaimin Bin Munir, Akib Jawad Ononto, Nazia Shehnaz Joynab et al.· 0 citations
Att2RAG is presented, a double-condition framework for knowledge poisoning attacks on RAG systems that decomposes a successful poisoning event into a retrieval condition and a generation condition, and casts poisoning as maximizing attack success subject to satisfying both conditions.
Zhize Hao· Poster Volume 0008 The 2026...· 0 citations
This work proposes a refined security principle: only agents capable of deliberative System 2 reasoning may access untrusted documents, and empirically compares state-of-the-art reasoning language models with standard language models to show that reasoning-capable models are substantially more robust to corrupted evide...
Mehrdad Ghassabi· 0 citations
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